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Abstract
Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate and control one’s own cognitive processes.
Metacognition operates over a range of cognitive domains, such as perception and memory,
but the neurocognitive architecture supporting this ability remains controversial. Is
metacognition enabled by a common, domain-general resource that is recruited to evaluate
performance on a variety of tasks? Or is metacognition reliant on domain-specific modules?
This article reviews recent literature on the domain-generality of human metacognition,
drawing on evidence from individual differences and neuroimaging. A meta-analysis of
behavioral studies found that perceptual metacognitive ability was correlated across different
sensory modalities, but found no correlation between metacognition of perception and
memory. However, evidence for domain-generality from behavioral data may suffer from a
lack of power to identify correlations across model parameters indexing metacognitive
efficiency. Neuroimaging data provide a complementary perspective on the domain-
generality of metacognition, revealing co-existence of neural signatures that are common and
distinct across tasks. We suggest that such an architecture may be appropriate for “tagging”
generic feelings of confidence with domain-specific information, in turn forming the basis for
priors about self-ability and modulation of higher-order behavioral control.
Whether a mental process is domain-general (shares resources across many situations or
tasks) or domain-specific is a broad question that is pertinent to many areas of psychology.
For instance, it has long been debated whether intelligence relies on a single underlying
resource (a g factor) or on independent components (Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005; Kanazawa,
2004; Kievit et al., 2017). In cognitive neuroscience, Duncan et al. have proposed that a
“multiple demand” system supports executive functions across many different tasks (Duncan,
2010). In this article, we focus on recent research on the domain-generality of neurocognitive
substrates supporting metacognition.
Metacognition is defined as cognition about cognition—the ability to reflect on, monitor
and control another cognitive process (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; Nelson & Narens, 1990).
In the laboratory, as we will see in more detail below, metacognition can be assessed by
recording individuals’ judgments of their performance on a particular task, such as their
confidence in a decision or a judgment of whether learning will be successful (a “second-
order” judgment). Because metacognition is by definition second-order to other cognitive
processes, it may operate across multiple “domains” of cognition—for instance, one might
engage in metacognition about percepts, about memories, about decisions, and so forth.
Progress has been made on understanding the neural basis of metacognition (see Fleming &
Dolan, 2012 for a review), which will be considered at more length below. However, it remains
poorly understood as to whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is
“applied” to the task at hand, or whether different metacognitive processes are engaged when
evaluating performance in different domains (Figure 1a). This article reviews and critically
appraises progress on this issue.
Measures of metacognition
In order to assess the relationship between metacognition across domains, we require metrics
of metacognitive ability that are robust and comparable across tasks. Here we focus on
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questionnaires. Some second-order judgments are less suitable for
cross-domain comparison because they are inherently domain-
specific. For instance, judgments of learning (JOLs) refer directly
to the learning process (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969), and are
therefore not applicable when investigating metacognition of
perception. For this reason comparisons of metacognition across
domains have tended to focus on retrospective confidence judg-
ments of performance—a judgment of confidence that a previous
decision involving internal process X was correct, where X could
refer to any cognitive process, such as perceptual discrimination
or memory retrieval. Once such judgments have been collected
over several trials of a task they can be compared to objective
accuracy to build up a picture of an individual’s metacognitive
ability. In general, metacognition is said to be accurate when
correct decisions are held with high confidence and incorrect
decisions are held with lower confidence—in other words,
metacognitive accuracy refers to the correlation between task
performance and confidence. The various approaches for char-
acterizing this correlation have been comprehensively reviewed
elsewhere (Fleming & Lau, 2014).
It is useful to distinguish two aspects of metacognitive judg-
ments—their sensitivity and bias. These are illustrated in the
cartoon in Figure 1b. Each panel shows example probability
densities of confidence ratings conditional on correct and incor-
rect task performance. If these distributions are cleanly separated,
this implies the subject is able to recognize accurate from inac-
curate performance using the confidence scale and we would
describe them as having a high degree of metacognitive sensitivity.
In contrast, metacognitive bias refers to an overall level of con-
fidence averaging over performance. These aspects of metacog-
nition are theoretically independent. For instance, someone who
has low overall confidence (low bias) may still be sensitive on a
trial-by-trial basis to fluctuations in performance (high sensitiv-
ity). By applying a modification of signal detection theory (SDT),
known as “type 2” SDT, it is possible to quantify sensitivity and
bias of ratings with respect to objective performance (Clarke,
Birdsall, & Tanner, 1959; Fleming & Lau, 2014; Galvin, Podd,
Drga, & Whitmore, 2003).
However, when making inferences about processes that are
shared or distinct across domains, it is important to ensure that
estimation of these components of metacognition is not con-
founded by first-order task performance. For instance, we might
find that metacognitive sensitivity is highly correlated across two
unrelated tasks, but this correlation would be less interesting if it
were simply a consequence of first-order performance also being
correlated between tasks. Indeed, several measures of metacog-
nitive sensitivity (such as area under the type 2 Receiver Oper-
ating Characteristic curve [AUROC2) and confidence-accuracy
correlations) are themselves affected by first-order performance
(Galvin et al., 2003; Masson & Rotello, 2009)—the same indivi-
dual will likely show greater metacognitive sensitivity on an easy
task compared with a hard task. If performance is not matched or
accounted for between conditions, erroneous conclusions may be
drawn, for instance that a patient group has a deficit in meta-
cognition when such a deficit is instead explained by a difference
in first-order performance (Figure 2).
One elegant solution to the problem of controlling for per-
formance confounds is the meta-d’ framework developed by
Maniscalco and Lau (2012). This approach posits a generative
model of confidence data within a SDT framework. Fitting the
model to data returns a parameter, meta-d’, that reflects the level
of first-order performance (known as d’) that would have led to
the observed confidence rating data under an ideal observer
model. Meta-d’ can then be compared with actual d’ (for instance
by computing the ratio meta-d’/d’) to give a measure of meta-
cognitive efficiency, which quantifies the level of metacognitive
sensitivity relative to first-order performance. By using meta-
cognitive efficiency as our measure of metacognition we can
meaningfully compare scores across individuals or task domains.

















Figure 1. (a) It remains debated whether metacognition operates as a domain-general resource applied over cognitive domains (left) and/or whether metacognition itself relies
on domain-specific components that operate over corresponding cognitive domains. (b) Metacognitive bias and metacognitive sensitivity are two independent aspects of
metacognition. Metacognitive bias corresponds to an overall tendency to rate confidence higher (right panels) or lower (left panels), irrespective of performance. Metacognitive















Figure 2. Top panel: differences in task performance might produce spurious
differences in metacognitive sensitivity between groups or task domains. Bottom
panel: if task performance is matched between domains, differences in metacog-
nitive sensitivity are likely to reflect true differences in metacognition.
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employed, it is important to ensure that any potential confounds
due to differences in first-order performance between conditions
are examined and accounted for (Figure 2).
Domain-generality in metacognitive ability (1): individual
differences
A classical approach to studying domain-generality of mental
processes is examining patterns of individual differences to ask
whether variance is shared or distinct across tasks. Assuming that
our metrics are reliable and free of confounds, cross-correlations
between domains indicate shared constraints on a particular
ability. For instance, if we find that across individuals, faster
choice response times are strongly predictive of IQ scores, we
might conclude that greater processing speed contributes to both
decision time and intelligence (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2010;
Ritchie, Bates, Der, Starr, & Deary, 2013). Correlations of meta-
cognitive measures with other stable individual differences (such
as personality or mental health) may also reveal domain-general
aspects of metacognition. In this section we review studies that
have taken this approach to investigate domain-general and
domain-specific aspects of metacognitive efficiency and bias, and
provide a formal meta-analysis to quantify behavioral evidence
for domain-generality.
In the perceptual domain, metacognitive sensitivity (mea-
sured as AUROC2) has been found to be correlated across
individuals for contrast and orientation discrimination tasks
(Song et al., 2011), despite perceptual thresholds (first-order
performance) in each case being uncorrelated. Similar results were
found when examining metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’)
correlations across visual, auditory, and tactile modalities (Faivre,
Filevich, Solovey, Kühn, & Blanke, 2018). Tactile metacognitive
sensitivity (measured using AUROC2) was found to be uncorre-
lated with metacognitive sensitivity on cardiac and respiratory
discrimination tasks, despite the latter correlating with each other
(Garfinkel et al., 2016). Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld, and Sigman
(2016) found strong correlations between metacognitive bias
(average confidence levels) across several perceptual tasks (audi-
tory, luminance and contrast discrimination tasks, and a “partial
report” task which required identification of a letter in a briefly
flashed array). However, they found correlations in metacognitive
sensitivity (AUROC2) only between auditory and luminance tasks.
In addition, this study identified similar confidence “profiles” for a
given individual, indicating idiosyncratic and stable patterns of
confidence ratings across tasks (Ais et al., 2016).
Although these studies explored inter-relationships between
metacognition in different perceptual modalities, it could be
argued that all such tasks belong to a broader perceptual domain,
but are further in task space from other cognitive domains such as
memory. Within the memory domain, metacognitive bias, but not
metacognitive sensitivity (assessed by the degree of match
between confidence and recall performance), was found to be
correlated across face and word recall tasks (Bornstein & Zick-
afoose, 1999; Sadeghi, Ekhtiari, Bahrami, & Ahmadabadi, 2017;
Thompson & Mason, 1996; West & Stanovich, 1997) and across a
variety of JOL tasks (Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000)—albeit in
these studies first-order performance was not matched across
tasks. More recent studies have compared metacognition for
perception and memory while also matching performance: In this
case, metacognitive efficiency was correlated between perceptual
and memory domains (McCurdy, Maniscalco, Metcalfe, Liu, de
Lange & Lau, 2013; Palmer, David, & Fleming, 2014). Samaha and
Postle also found evidence of domain-generality in metacognitive
sensitivity for perceptual discrimination and visual working
memory (measured using performance-confidence correlations
and AUROC2), but whether this result reflects generalization
beyond perception is unclear because perceptual resources may
also be required for short-term memory of visual orientation
(Samaha & Postle, 2017). In contrast, other studies found no
correlation between metacognitive efficiency across memory and
perceptual tasks (Baird, Cieslak, Smallwood, Grafton, &
Schooler, 2015; Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies,
2013; Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018). These mixed findings
may be due to differences in metacognition metrics (AUROC2
in Baird et al. vs. meta-d’/d’ in McCurdy et al. and Morales, Lau,
& Fleming, 2018), and/or differences in task requirements (two-
alternative-forced choice [2AFC] vs. Yes/No) (Ruby, Giles, &
Lau, 2017), as we discuss further below. Finally, no correlation
was found between metacognitive sensitivity (measured using
AUROC2) on a visual discrimination task and a task involving
mentalizing and reasoning (Valk, Bernhardt, Böckler, Kanske, &
Singer, 2016) or between metacognitive sensitivity on percep-
tion, memory and error awareness tasks (Fitzgerald, Arvaneh, &
Dockree, 2017).
The above studies can be clustered into two main groups:
those that examine inter-correlations between metacognitive
sensitivity in different perceptual discrimination tasks and those
studying correlations between metacognition of recognition
memory and perception. To assess evidence for domain-
generality we conducted a meta-analysis of cross-domain corre-
lation coefficients for these two study categories (Figure 3). From
a literature search we identified studies that fell into one of these
categories and employed signal-detection theoretic measures of
metacognition (M-ratio or AUROC), revealing 12 manuscripts
and 19 total independent experiments. Effect size (r), sample size
(n), and types of cross-domain correlation (memory-perception
vs. perception-perception) were hand coded. In cases where
multiple modalities were probed within a sample (e.g., audition,
touch, and vision), the “multi-modal” r-value was calculated as
the average R across modalities. Meta-analytic effect sizes (cross-
domain r) were calculated using a Fisher R-to-Z random effects
model, implemented in the metafor R-package, version 3.3.2
(Viechtbauer, 2010). Specifically, we performed three meta-ana-
lyses—one of overall cross-domain correlations (n= 19), one on
cross-domain correlations within the perceptual modality (n= 9),
and another of memory-perception cross-domain correlations
(n= 10).
We found that across all studies, cross-domain correlations
were significantly greater than zero (meta-analytic r= 0.27, 95%
confidence interval [CI]= [0.13, 0.41], p< .001) and exhibited
significant heterogeneity across effect sizes (Q= 50.46, df= 18,
p< .001, I 2= 69.7%). This result was primarily driven by medium
to strong cross-perceptual correlations (meta-analytic r= 0.55,
95% CI = [0.34, 0.76], p< .001). Restricting our analysis to
perceptual effect sizes, we did not observe significant hetero-
geneity (Q= 14.49, df = 8, p= .07, I 2= 45.4%). In contrast, cross-
domain correlations between memory and perception-based tasks
were not significant (r= 0.09, 95% CI = [− 0.02, 0.21], p= .10),
and did not show effect heterogeneity (Q= 14.76, df = 9, p= .09,
I 2= 38.3%). These results suggest that cross-task correlations in
metacognitive ability are primarily obtained when examining
tasks tapping into the same functional modality, that is perception
(Figure 3).
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Such results may initially appear to support a conclusion that
memory and perceptual metacognition rely on largely separate,
domain-specific processes. However, one potential caveat is that
some studies have compared yes-no (Y/N) tasks with 2AFC tasks.
In 2AFC tasks, a pair of stimuli is presented, for instance
reporting which of two intervals contains a brighter stimulus. In
Y/N tasks, a single stimulus is presented which must be classified
as a target or lure. Metacognition for Y/N and 2AFC tasks may
appear different not because of a true difference between
domains, but because of a difference in the processes that generate
confidence ratings in the two cases (Ruby, Giles, & Lau, 2017).
Specifically, previous studies have documented that meta-d’ fol-
lowing “no” responses in a Y/N task is substantially lower than
meta-d’ following equivalent “yes” responses (Meuwese, van
Loon, Lamme, & Fahrenfort, 2014; Kanai et al., 2010), potentially
obscuring a latent domain-general component (Ruby, Giles, &
Lau, 2017). In addition, an absence of correlation may result from
a lack of statistical power rather than a true null effect, particu-
larly given the small sample sizes often employed in previous
studies. Future studies could profitably employ Bayesian statistics
to directly assess evidence in favor of the null hypothesis when
examining cross-domain correlations.
Another candidate explanation for discrepant findings when
studying across-domain correlations in metacognitive efficiency
corresponds to the variety of metrics employed to assess meta-
cognitive sensitivity (correlations, AUROC2, meta-d’), and
the reliability of within-subject measures of metacognition.
Metacognitive sensitivity is itself a measure of association between
two variables (performance and confidence) that requires several
trials to be estimated with sufficient stability and therefore there is
inevitable uncertainty in the estimation of within-domain para-
meters (Fleming, 2017). This within-subject uncertainty is rarely
taken into account in analyses of individual differences (although
see Samaha & Postle, 2017), which typically rely on point esti-
mates such as AUROC2 or maximum likelihood estimates of
meta-d’. Recently, we have developed a Bayesian framework
(HMeta-d) for estimating meta-d’ both at the level of individual
subjects and groups of subjects (Fleming, 2017). One advantage of
this framework for analyses of domain-generality is that it can be
extended to estimate correlation coefficients between domains.
Unlike classic point-estimate approaches, this ensures that
uncertainty in individual metacognitive efficiency estimates
appropriately propagates through to uncertainty around the
cross-domain correlation coefficient.
This effect can be appreciated in simulations plotted in
Figure 4 (code available at https://github.com/metacoglab/
RouaultDomainReview). Here we generated confidence rating
data from N= 100 simulated subjects across two “domains.” The
group metacognitive efficiency was set to 0.8 in both domains,
and individual subject meta-d’/d’ values sampled from a bivariate
Gaussian distribution with a true correlation in metacognitive
efficiency between domains of 0.5. We sampled confidence rating
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Figure 3. Forest plot for our three meta-analyses examining the meta-analytic strength of cross-domain correlations of metacognition. The first focused on studies in the
perceptual domain (e.g., visual, tactile). The second examined the cross-domain correlation of metacognition in perceptual versus memory-based tasks, and the third
estimated the overall meta-analytic cross-domain correlation across all studies. The results show that metacognitive ability is primarily preserved across perceptual tasks, but
does not generalize to memory-based tasks. The right column indicates the Fisher’s z transformed correlation coefficient. CI= confidence interval.
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counts for known meta-d’/d’ values using the metad_sim function
from the HMeta-d toolbox (https://github.com/metacoglab/
HMeta-d), keeping confidence rating criteria fixed across
domains and subjects. The number of trials per subject differed
between simulations (50 vs. 400). The model outputs a posterior
belief distribution over the across-domain correlation coefficient.
It can be seen that as the number of trials per subject increases
(i.e., the certainty associated with individual meta-d’ estimates
goes up, lower panel in Figure 4), we can be more certain about
the presence of a domain-general correlation (narrower posterior
density). We recommend applying such multi-level models when
analyzing individual difference correlations to ensure this para-
meter uncertainty is appropriately taken into account.
Other studies have investigated relationships between meta-
cognition and other aspects of personality and executive function
which, if found, would lend support to a domain-general meta-
cognitive contribution to metacognition. For instance, factors
such as general intelligence or motivation to engage with a task
could affect metacognition over multiple domains. However, if
such general factors are significantly altered, it is unlikely that
metacognitive processes would be selectively affected while also
leaving first-order performance spared; for instance, an altered
ability to follow task instructions following a prefrontal cortex
(PFC) lesion is likely to affect both task performance and meta-
cognitive evaluation. The integrity of these “global” factors can
thus be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for
enabling metacognition. Notably, however, despite both relying
on aspects of higher cognition, we have found that over several
datasets perceptual metacognitive efficiency is not related to
measures of fluid intelligence (Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012;
Palmer, David, & Fleming, 2014), even when such correlations
were examined in a large-scale dataset of ~1,000 individuals
(Rouault, Seow, Gillan, & Fleming, 2018). Such independence
may be due to fluid intelligence relying on posterolateral frontal
and parietal “multiple demand” regions (Woolgar et al., 2010),
whereas metacognition has been linked to anterior prefrontal
regions, as considered in more detail below.
In summary, analyses of individual differences in metacogni-
tive efficiency indicate the presence of domain-general contribu-
tions to confidence judgments across distinct perceptual
discrimination tasks. Such variation in metacognition is isolated
from variation in first-order performance. However, it remains
unclear whether a shared resource supports metacognitive effi-
ciency across more distant domains, such as recognition memory
and perceptual discrimination. One important consideration in
conducting such cross-domain correlation analyses is to ensure
that uncertainty in estimation of metacognition within a parti-
cular domain is appropriately propagated to the analysis of
between-domain correlations, which is now possible within
hierarchical Bayesian frameworks. Taken together these findings
also raise the issue of how to define a separation between
domains, and whether the notion of domain should instead be
considered as existing along a continuum or gradient (see
“Computational processes” section below). Furthermore we
should remain mindful that the architecture of metacognition
(and therefore any shared variance between different tasks) may
meta-d'/d' task A




































































50 trials per subject
400 trials per subject
Figure 4. Simulations of hierarchical meta-d’ model (HMeta-d) estimation of the covariance between metacognitive efficiencies for 100 simulated subjects with an average
meta-d’/d’ ratio of 0.8. Upper panels correspond to 50 trials per subject, lower panels to 400 trials per subject. The “ground truth” correlation coefficient in both cases was 0.5,
and in both cases we recovered a significant correlation between point estimates obtained using single-subject maximum likelihood. Notably, the posterior over the correlation
coefficient is narrower around the true value (shown by the dotted vertical line) when there are more trials per subject (lower row), reflecting increased certainty in subject-
level meta-d’ parameter estimation.
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well be organized along different lines than the cognitive pro-
cesses being monitored, and which are typically compared in the
laboratory (e.g., perception, memory).
Domain-generality in metacognitive ability (2):
neuropsychology
The study of individual differences identifies shared variance in
behavioral performance across a large number of healthy indivi-
duals. In contrast, neuropsychology seeks to identify dissociations
between abilities induced by patterns of brain damage. Classic
studies by Shimamura and colleagues revealed that metamemory
abilities (such as feeling of knowing [FOK] or JOLs) are selectively
impaired following frontal lesions (Janowsky, Shimamura, &
Squire, 1989; Shimamura & Squire, 1986). Metamemory evalua-
tion has itself been divided into distinct judgment types (see
Chua, Pergolizzi, & Weintraub, 2014, for a review). A key dis-
tinction is that judgments can be either prospective, occurring
prior to memory retrieval, or retrospective. Prospective judgments
include FOK, the likelihood of recognizing an item that currently
cannot be recalled, and JOL, a belief during learning about the
success of subsequent recall. More recent studies indicated such
lesion deficits may not apply to all forms of metamemory judg-
ment. For instance, two independent studies found that damage
to the medial PFC was associated with decreased prospective
FOK accuracy but intact retrospective confidence judgments
(Schnyer et al., 2004) and JOLs (Modirrousta & Fellows, 2008).
The reverse dissociation was reported by Pannu and Kaszniak
(2005), who found that deficits in retrospective confidence
judgments were associated with lateral frontal lesions.
Fewer studies have taken a neuropsychological approach to
ask whether metacognitive deficits are shared across multiple task
domains. Fleming et al. (2014) studied three groups of subjects
matched for age and IQ—a healthy control group, a group with
aPFC lesions, and a group with temporal lobe lesions. Each
participant completed both a recognition memory task with word
stimuli and a perceptual discrimination task about the relative
density of two dot patches. In both tasks retrospective confidence
ratings were elicited on a trial-by-trial basis, allowing assessment
of meta-d’ for each subject/task domain. A selective deficit in
metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) for perceptual discrimina-
tion was observed in the aPFC group (Figure 5a) despite
equivalent first-order performance and metacognitive bias. Such a
result is consistent with a contribution of aPFC to metacognition
of perceptual decision-making (Allen et al., 2017; Fleming, Weil,
Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Yokoyama et al., 2010), but suggests
other brain regions may be sufficient to support intact metacog-
nition of recognition memory (Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al.,
2013). Notably, all patients were tested in a post-acute phase of
their lesion, so it is possible that an early domain-general deficit
may have been observed sooner after surgery. More generally,







Figure 5. Different methodologies for quantifying brain structure and function shed light on the underpinnings of metacognition across domains. (a) Human subjects with
anterior prefrontal cortex lesions (aPFC) were found to have reduced metacognitive efficiency on a perceptual but not a memory task (lower panel), compared with temporal
lobe lesion patients (TL) and healthy controls (HC), despite matched performance and task difficulty (upper panel; reproduced from Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014).
(b) Individual differences in metacognitive efficiency for perception were found to correlate with aPFC grey matter volume, whereas individual differences in metacognitive
efficiency for memory were found to correlate with medial parietal cortex (precuneus) grey matter volume. Structural variation in each of these regions was in turn positively
correlated across participants, translating into a behavioral correlation of metacognitive efficiencies between domains (reproduced from McCurdy et al., 2013). (c) Multivariate
analyses of human neuroimaging data revealed widespread classification of confidence level in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/pre-supplementary motor area (dACC/pre-
SMA), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and striatum that generalized across domains (yellow). In contrast, domain-specific patterns of confidence-related activity were
identified in right lateral aPFC (region of interest analysis not shown; reproduced from Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018).
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difficult to draw strong conclusions about the typical functional
anatomy of metacognition from lesion studies alone (Lemaitre,
Herbet, Duffau, & Lafargue, 2017).
Domain-generality in metacognitive ability (3):
neuroimaging
Behavioral and neuropsychological data can inform on whether a
mental process relies on a shared resource, but provide less insight
into the mechanisms that underpin this resource. As noted above, a
common resource may be involved but not be detected due to
domain-specific unreliability in the measurement of metacognition.
Conversely, a domain-general pattern may be driven by a third
factor that affects domain-specific processes in equal measure, such
as stress (Reyes, Silva, Jaramillo, Rehbein, & Sackur, 2015) or
fatigue (Maniscalco, McCurdy, Odegaard, & Lau, 2017).
Several recent studies have focused on the neural basis of
human metacognition, which have been reviewed at length else-
where (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). Briefly, in concordance with the
neuropsychological literature highlighted above, anatomical
(Allen et al., 2017; Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013) and
functional (Baird et al., 2013; Cortese, Amano, Koizumi, Kawato,
& Lau, 2016; De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Fleck,
Daselaar, Dobbins, & Cabeza, 2006; Fleming et al., 2012; Hil-
genstock, Weiss, & Witte, 2014; Yokoyama et al., 2010) neuroi-
maging data indicate that a frontoparietal network contributes to
metacognitive estimates of task performance across a range of
tasks. Within this network, electrophysiological studies in
humans have focused on the role of the posterior medial frontal
cortex (pMFC) and associated error-related negativity in perfor-
mance monitoring (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin,
1993; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). More recently, aPFC has
also been implicated in supporting explicit metacognitive judg-
ments, leading Fleming and Dolan (2012) to propose that con-
nectivity between interoceptive cortices (cingulate and insula) and
aPFC may underpin the fidelity of explicit metacognition. Non-
human electrophysiological work has also identified a key role for
frontoparietal areas in confidence formation. In particular,
recordings in monkey lateral intraparietal cortex indicate that
variability in lateral intraparietal cortex firing rates is predictive of
both decisions and decision confidence (Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani,
Hopp, & Shadlen, 2011; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). Furthermore,
activity in rat orbitofrontal cortex carries signals related to deci-
sion confidence in a perceptual discrimination task (Kepecs,
Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008). However, the distinct com-
putational roles of these regions, and whether such neural sub-
strates of confidence are shared or distinct across tasks remains
unclear. In what follows we selectively focus on studies which
directly compare neural correlates of metacognition across task
domains using neuroimaging techniques in humans.
An intriguing example of a domain-general pattern in behavior
that could be explained by domain-specific neural resources was
reported by McCurdy et al. (2013). In this study, the same parti-
cipants carried out 2AFC perceptual discrimination (Gabor contrast
discrimination) and recognition memory judgments together with
confidence ratings. As noted above, this study obtained behavioral
evidence for a domain-general correlation between metacognitive
abilities across the two domains. However, each participant also
underwent a structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to
enable analysis of individual variation in grey matter volume across
the cortex. It was found that metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’)
for perception correlated with grey matter volume in the aPFC
(Figure 5b; see also Allen et al., 2017; Fleming et al., 2010), whereas
meta-d’/d’ on the memory task correlated with grey matter volume
in the precuneus. Using structural equation modeling, the best
model of the data was one in which the structure of two domain-
specific regions was correlated across individuals, thereby explaining
a domain-general finding in behavior via the coupling of two
domain-specific resources. This example shows how neuroimaging
data can shed additional light on the cognitive architectures that
determine individual differences in metacognition.
Other studies combining analyses of individual differences
with structural and diffusion imaging measurements have also
provided evidence for the involvement of distinct neural struc-
tures in metacognition across domains. Metacognitive accuracy on
a visual task was shown to correlate with white matter micro-
structure underlying the ACC, whereas metacognitive accuracy for
a memory task correlated with white matter underlying the
inferior parietal lobule (Baird et al., 2015). In analysis of resting
state functional connectivity data, connectivity between ACC and
aPFC was related to more accurate perceptual metacognition
judgments, whereas increased connectivity between precuneus,
inferior parietal lobule and aPFC predicted better metamemory
(Baird et al., 2013). Furthermore, cortical thickness mapping
revealed domain-specific substrates structurally related to meta-
cognition of perception (right medial PFC) versus mentalizing
(bilateral PFC, temporo-parietal cortex, posterior medial parietal
cortex) (Valk et al., 2016).
In perceptual decision-making tasks, classical univariate analyses
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) BOLD signal
reveal a negative parametric relationship between confidence reports
and activity in pMFC (encompassing dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
and pre-supplementary motor area) (Fleck et al., 2006; Heereman,
Walter, & Heekeren, 2015; Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018), which
are also observed in the memory domain (episodic retrieval) (Fleck
et al., 2006). In pMFC and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
multivariate fMRI analyses revealed that it was possible to predict
confidence in a memory task from patterns decoded in a perceptual
task matched for stimulus and task requirements, and vice-versa
(Figure 5C), suggesting that confidence covaries with task-
independent neural representations (Morales, Lau, & Fleming,
2018). In contrast, right lateral aPFC instead showed significant
decoding effects within- but not across-domain. This domain-
specific neural representation of confidence suggests that lateral
aPFC may “tag” metacognitive representations with task-specific
information, which could be particularly relevant for future meta-
level control decisions such as which task to engage in next.
We note that some observations of domain-generality in
neural data may be due not only to confidence but other corre-
lated variables, for instance, decision time, which has been pro-
posed as a relevant input for a confidence computation (Kiani,
Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014), and expected value. Some studies of
confidence explicitly modeled reaction times in their fMRI ana-
lysis (Fleck et al., 2006; Gherman & Philiastides, 2017; Lebreton,
Abitbol, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2015), whereas others did not
(Heereman, Walter, & Heekeren, 2015; Morales, Lau, & Fleming,
2018), and it is not straightforward to determine whether decision
time should be treated as a confound or a relevant variable of
interest for studies of the neural basis of metacognition. Notably,
regions often implicated in encoding expected value such as
ventral striatum and vmPFC (Clithero & Rangel, 2013) are also
often found to scale with confidence in perception, value and
memory domains (De Martino et al., 2013; Gherman &
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Philiastides, 2017; Lebreton et al., 2015; Morales, Lau, & Fleming,
2018), suggesting that being confident is valuable, and/or that
when highly confident, subjects expect imminent reward. The fact
that a majority of studies have not dissociated confidence from
implicit expected value potentially explains these pervasive,
domain-general activations. Future studies are required to directly
investigate a putative commonality of confidence and value
representations, and to separate the component inputs to con-
fidence formation (Bang & Fleming, 2018).
Previous studies have suggested that involvement of the pre-
cuneus (medial parietal cortex) is specific to metamemory judg-
ments. Indeed individual metacognitive efficiency in a memory
task, but not in a perceptual task, was found to correlate with gray
matter volume in the precuneus (McCurdy et al., 2013), and
resting-state functional connectivity revealed that better meta-
memory was associated with increased connectivity between medial
aPFC and precuneus (Baird et al., 2013). In addition, transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) application over precuneus impaired
metacognitive efficiency for memory but not perception, both
measured as meta-d’ - d’ (Ye, Zou, Lau, Hu, & Kwok, 2018), and
univariate fMRI activation in precuneus was selectively increased
during metacognitive judgments of memory, but not perception
(Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018). However, a relationship between
precuneus grey matter volume and metacognitive efficiency has
also been detected in a perceptual decision-making task, albeit at an
uncorrected whole-brain threshold (Fleming et al., 2010). More-
over, the same region was found to correlate negatively with con-
fidence level in a visual motion-discrimination task (Heereman,
Walter, & Heekeren, 2015). Lastly, using multivariate decoding of
fMRI activity, Morales et al. found that classification of high versus
low confidence trials in precuneus generalized across memory and
perception domains (Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018). Together
these results suggest that precuneus involvement may not be spe-
cific to metamemory. Interestingly, recent results suggest that the
vividness of episodic memory was tracked by precuneus activity
over and above memory precision and retrieval success (Richter,
Cooper, Bays, & Simons, 2016). To the extent to which similar
appraisals of vividness feed into the formation of perceptual con-
fidence, this may explain the domain-general nature of findings in
this region. An interesting alternative possibility is that precuneus is
engaged when subjects leverage prior beliefs about self-ability to
compute confidence in perception, hence needing to retrieve global
beliefs about past experience from memory (see also Figure 6).
In summary, neuroimaging studies indicate a more nuanced
picture than studies of behavior or individual differences, which
have tended to argue for either domain-specific or domain-
general aspects of metacognition. It is possible to reconcile these
perspectives by demonstrating that both domain-specific and
domain-general signals co-exist in the human brain, and that
there may exist a gradient in which some tasks (such as different
types of perceptual judgment) are more likely to rely on shared
circuitry for metacognitive evaluation than others. In the next
section we attempt to formalize these ideas through the lens of
computational modeling.
Computational processes supporting metacognition across
domains
Models of confidence formation
The simplest first-order models of confidence formation (such as
SDT) assume that the internal states supporting decisions and
confidence estimates are identical. Such frameworks predict that
any covariation between metacognitive efficiency across domains
should be accompanied by covariation in lower-level perfor-
mance, and struggle to accommodate the evidence reviewed above
that confidence can be selectively altered or impaired indepen-
dently of task performance (see also Cortese et al., 2016; Lak et al.,
2014; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010).
An extension to first-order models of confidence introduces post-
decisional processing, thus explaining additional variability in
confidence estimates without altering the fidelity of first-order
performance (Navajas et al., 2017; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010;
van den Berg et al., 2016). A somewhat more elaborate but flexible
model is a “second-order” computation of confidence (Fleming &
Daw, 2017). In the second-order framework, the efficacy of
actions is monitored based on higher-order knowledge of the
reliability of the decision-making system.
A second-order account provides a natural perspective on
findings of domain-generality in metacognition. Similar circuits
for second-order inference may be engaged across different
domains to the extent to which their lower-level states and actions
are similar (the “inputs” and “outputs”; see Figure 6). To take a
concrete example, suppose that we are comparing metacognitive
efficiency for a visual and auditory discrimination task, both
requiring a right-handed button press to indicate the first-order
judgment. While in each task, “state” estimation may depend on
distinct (visual and auditory) neural circuitry; actions are sup-
ported by a common output (the left motor cortex). This com-
monality in response mapping may be sufficient to induce
commonalities in second-order inference, leading to the obser-
vations of domain-general confidence signals in neuroimaging
data. Such a pattern was observed by Faivre et al., who suggest,
“the supramodality of metacognition relies on supramodal con-
fidence estimates and decisional signals that are shared across
sensory modalities” (2018).
However, current computational models of confidence are
relatively narrow in scope, focusing on experimentally con-
trollable states and actions. To the extent that other internal
variables covary with expected success, these may also become
relevant “inputs” for subjective confidence. For instance, response




















Figure 6. Theoretical framework for metacognition, grounded in models of sensory
systems. The two boxes represent domains-specific computations solving two
different tasks such as visual and auditory discrimination. Decision-making proceeds
in a domain-specific fashion following the principles of Bayesian inference, while a
metacognitive layer computes confidence (= p(correct|data)) in each task.
Metacognitive inference is itself under the control of priors that may be updated
based on previous experience.
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available to the agent for computing confidence (Benjamin, Bjork,
& Schwartz, 1998; Kiani et al., 2014). However, for response times
to be informative, one needs to have an estimation of the expected
level of performance on the task, for instance, in the form of a
running average over decision accuracy in a given experimental
condition. If expected performance is variable within a task, or if
it varies significantly across tasks, response times might be less
useful as proxies for inferring decision accuracy and hence con-
fidence. For example, in situations where noise in the stimulus
induces a deviation from the expected performance level, the
expected mapping between confidence and decision time may
break down (Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome & Shadlen, 2014; Rahnev,
Maniscalco, Luber, Lau & Lisanby, 2011; Peters et al., 2017;
Zylberberg, Fetsch & Shadlen, 2016). Similarly, interoceptive
states may provide additional proxies when evaluating self-
performance (Allen et al., 2016; Chua & Bliss-Moreau, 2016).
This perspective on the formation of confidence in decision-
making converges with established “inferential” or cue-based
models of confidence formation in the metamemory literature,
which suggest that cues such as accessibility (the degree of partial
knowledge about the target) contribute to confidence estimates
(Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 2001). Similarly, familiarity with the
stimuli (De Martino et al., 2013), and volatility/variability in sti-
mulus evidence (Meyniel, Schlunegger & Dehaene, 2015; Zyl-
berberg, Fetsch & Shadlen, 2016) also inform confidence. To the
extent that some cues, such as response time or fluency, are useful
across many different tasks, they may provide domain-general
inputs to confidence and metacognition (Alter and Oppenheimer,
2009; Boldt, de Gardelle, & Yeung, 2017).
How does confidence guide behavior?
If confidence constitutes a proxy for the probability of success in a
task (Peirce and Jastrow, 1884; Pouget, Drugowitsch, & Kepecs,
2016), it may act as a “common currency” signal for estimating
and comparing the relative likelihood of success between different
tasks (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014). Such a common currency
would be particularly useful when deciding on which tasks or
goals to pursue in the future, especially when external feedback is
unavailable. For instance, when choosing a career, it would be
advantageous to internally evaluate and compare our perfor-
mance or skill in different potential jobs. The existence of a
common currency for confidence is supported by studies showing
that subjects are able to compare confidence across visual and
auditory tasks with the same precision as when comparing two
trials within the same task (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014; de
Gardelle, Le Corre, & Mamassian, 2016).
The notion that confidence may be compared between task
domains to facilitate flexible decision making is consistent with
the existence of both domain-general and domain-specific sig-
natures of confidence in neuroimaging data reviewed above. A
midline network with hubs in pMFC and vmPFC may provide a
nexus for monitoring arbitrary task-sets. In contrast, task-specific
confidence representations in lateral aPFC may allow the hier-
archical control of decision-making in situations in which sub-
jects need to regularly switch between tasks or strategies on the
basis of their reliability (Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin, 2014;
Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018). However, we note that the ability
to compare confidence between domains does not itself imply
that the representation of confidence at the neural level is
domain-general, and more investigation is needed into neural
signals that support such cross-task comparisons.
Another intriguing possibility is that the existence of midline
hubs for confidence formation leads to domain-general repre-
sentations of confidence which in turn act as priors on confidence
in other domains. In behavioral studies, a confidence “leak” has
been identified between a color and a symbol discrimination task,
where confidence in one task influences confidence in the other
regardless of actual performance. Notably, the ability to resist
such leakage was positively correlated with lateral aPFC grey
matter volume across subjects (Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy,
D’Esposito, & Lau, 2015). It is important, however, to distinguish
the notion of confidence leak (the temporal autocorrelation of
confidence ratings when several tasks are interleaved) from meta-
cognitive bias (the overall tendency to rate confidence higher or
lower irrespective of performance). A larger confidence leak across
trials is not necessarily linked to a higher or a lower metacognitive
bias, but confidence leak may represent a mediating factor in
explaining why metacognitive bias often generalizes across tasks (Ais
et al., 2016; Baird et al., 2013). In addition, if confidence leak is large,
confidence may become more loosely coupled to current perfor-
mance in tasks in which autocorrelations in stimuli are absent, which
could in turn decrease metacognitive efficiency. However, it remains
to be explored whether confidence leak extends across task domains
beyond perception. It could be that some domains are more sus-
ceptible to leak than others.
Ultimately, to understand the structure of metacognition
across task domains we should aim to understand what functions
metacognition provides to the system (the computational level in
Marr’s taxonomy). The formation of accurate beliefs about per-
formance is useful for learning, cognitive control and for social
interaction (such as when communicating confidence to others)
(Bang et al., 2017; Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin, 2014). But when
is it advantageous to share this computation across modalities or
inputs? We can think of two possible reasons. First, as stated
above, if tasks are composed of arbitrary state-action mappings
then it may be more computationally efficient to infer perfor-
mance in a global, task-independent frame of reference, for use in
control of future behavior (Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin., 2014).
Second, inferences about performance in one domain may be
useful as priors for performance in other domains to the extent
they share instrumental characteristics. For instance, if I infer that
I am very skilled at skiing, I might infer that I would also be good
at similar sports such as ice-skating, but, on this basis, it would
not be wise to also think I will be able to remember my to-do list.
In other words, it may be useful to generalize confidence level
across tasks according to their distance in task space. Conversely,
overgeneralization might be maladaptive, and the extent of
metacognitive generalization may itself constitute a stable indi-
vidual difference. For example, people with depression tend to
generalize more strongly from poor performance in one domain
to other domains, in turn reinforcing a lower level of self-esteem
and poorer self-efficacy that cuts across various areas of life
(Bandura, 1977; Elliott et al., 1996; Stephan et al., 2016).
Implications of domain-specific alterations in
metacognition for clinical populations
The study of metacognition provides an experimental window into
our subjective estimates of our internal states. The explanatory
potential of metacognition for mechanisms of pathogenesis and
maintenance of mental illness is therefore considerable, and meta-
cognitive deficits might be usefully measured in the clinic to guide
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assessment and management (Wells et al., 2012). Dissecting com-
putational mechanisms supporting metacognitive evaluation could
permit development of behavioral and neural interventions to
modulate and restore more accurate self-evaluation (Hauser et al.,
2017; Moro, Scandola, Bulgarelli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2015; Nair,
Palmer, Aleman, & David, 2014; Paulus, Huys, & Maia, 2016).
Domain-general beliefs about self-abilities are systematically
lowered in depressed and anxious patients, and form a promising
target for therapy (Bandura, 1977; Wells et al., 2012). One recent
theory specifies a central role for metacognition in the compu-
tational etiology of such beliefs (Stephan et al., 2016). Briefly,
symptoms of fatigue and depression are understood as sequential
responses to pervasive “dyshomeostasis”—chronically enhanced
surprise about internal bodily signals. This dyshomeostasis is
monitored by a domain-general metacognitive layer that down-
grades beliefs about the brain’s capacity to regulate performance
on a range of tasks (self-efficacy beliefs). Recently, we have sys-
tematically investigated the relation between subclinical psychia-
tric symptoms and metacognitive bias and efficiency in a large
general population sample, finding dissociable relationships
between psychopathology and metacognition in the absence of
any links to first-order performance on a perceptual decision-
making task (Rouault et al., 2018). A symptom dimension related
to anxiety and depression was associated with lower metacogni-
tive bias (lower confidence level) and heightened metacognitive
efficiency, whereas a dimension characterizing compulsive beha-
vior and intrusive thoughts was associated with higher meta-
cognitive bias and lower metacognitive efficiency. Metacognitive
bias has also been linked to trait optimism (Ais et al., 2016),
which is intriguing as in this study the questionnaire was admi-
nistered long after the experiment, suggesting a stable confidence
level that transcends testing sessions.
In contrast, domain-specific deficits in metacognition of
perception may play a role in the formation of hallucinations in
psychosis (Klein, Altinyazar, & Metz, 2013; Moritz et al., 2014).
Inaccurate metacognition for memory ability might explain
symptoms of functional memory loss, a problem seen commonly
in memory clinics (Stone et al., 2015) and account for why
people with Alzheimer’s disease often do not acknowledge their
memory deficits (Chapman et al., 2018) (as evaluated with
anosognosia questionnaires; Orfei et al., 2010); or objective tests
of metamemory performance (Cosentino, Metcalfe, Butterfield,
& Stern, 2007). It remains to be explored how metacognitive
efficiency as studied in laboratory tasks relates to real-world
metacognition, but a few studies hint at such a link. For instance,
participants with a higher level of metacognitive efficiency
(perceptual meta-d’/d’) were perceived by their informants (e.g.,
relatives) to have fewer problems with attentional control in
everyday life (Fitzgerald, Arvaneh, & Dockree, 2017). Another
study in older participants found that experimentally measured
metacognition (error awareness in a Go/NoGo task) correlated
with error monitoring deficits in everyday life (Harty, O’Connell,
Hester, & Robertson, 2013).
Some illnesses might appear to co-occur with a generalized
metacognitive impairment that underpins multiple problems or
leads to severe deficits in daily functioning. In some situations, this
metacognitive deficit is regarded as central to the mental dis-
turbance, such as a lack of insight common in some mental ill-
nesses (David, 1990). For instance, patients with neurological
disease and impaired knowledge of their disease (a symptom
known as anosognosia) might be viewed as having a prima facie
disturbance in metacognitive efficiency, although such a hypothesis
remains to be directly tested. Strikingly, full insight often does not
return despite overwhelming evidence of the neurological deficit
(Cocchini, Beschin, Fotopoulou, & Sala, 2010; Fotopoulou et al.,
2008). In the example of anosognosia for hemiplegia, a deficit in
metacognition generalized across cognitive domains yet specific to
the body part in question could go some way to explain this.
Initial findings of specific deficits in metacognition in neu-
ropsychiatric conditions have tended to focus on specific domains
of processing (such as memory in Alzheimer’s disease) and it
remains unknown whether these deficits generalize to other
domains. Approaches to tackling this question are synergistic
with transdiagnostic perspectives of psychopathology emerging in
neuroscience (Barch, 2017; Rouault et al., 2018). Greater knowl-
edge of the relationship between patterns of metacognitive deficits
and individual neuropsychiatric profiles may eventually allow
development of personalized therapeutic approaches and suggest
pathways to train resilience to mental illness (Moro et al., 2015;
Paulus, Huys, & Maia, 2016).
Conclusions and future directions
Here we have reviewed the recent literature comparing the neuro-
cognitive architecture of metacognition across domains. We have
distinguished between the constructs of metacognitive efficiency
(one’s sensitivity to fluctuations in task performance) and meta-
cognitive bias (one’s overall confidence level, irrespective of perfor-
mance). We have considered the importance of taking into account
variations in task performance when measuring metacognition to
allow meaningful comparisons across domains. In particular, it is
critical in future studies match task and stimulus characteristics for
across-domain comparison (e.g., Y/N vs. 2AFC). Finally, the use of a
hierarchical Bayesian framework allows uncertainty in metacognitive
efficiency parameters to be taken into account when examining
correlations across domains (Fleming, 2017).
Our review of neuroimaging studies indicates a more nuanced
picture of domain-generality than studies of behavior or indivi-
dual differences, which have tended to argue for either domain-
specific or domain-general aspects of metacognition, but not
both. Recent studies suggest that both domain-specific and
domain-general signals co-exist in the human brain, and that
there may exist a gradient in which some tasks (such as different
types of perceptual judgment) are more likely to rely on shared
circuitry for metacognitive evaluation than others. Finally, we
have highlighted the utility of computational models in providing
a framework for understanding how confidence is formed across
different tasks, and why it might be useful to maintain confidence
in a common currency when switching between tasks. We suggest
that the formation of confidence in one domain may provide
useful priors on confidence formation in other domains. Notably
the extent of such generalization itself could represent an indi-
vidual difference, with extreme over-generalization possibly
contributing to pervasive low self-efficacy often seen in depres-
sion and anxiety disorders.
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